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Star Co.,8 ' the court invalidated a statute making calendar pref-
erences mandatory, 2 stating:
[W]hile the Legislature has the power to alter and regulate the
proceedings in law and equity, it can only exercise such power in
that respect as it has heretofore exercised; and it has never before
attempted to deprive the courts of that judicial discretion which they
have been always accustomed to exercise.
83
If courts have a power to control their calendars, it would seem
they must also have inherent discretionary power to dismiss for
failure to prosecute.
However the constitutional issue may have been decided, the
Court chose not to base its decision thereon. Hopefully, the
uncertainty caused by the 1964 amendment to CPLR 3216 has
been ended so that the constitutional issue need never be decided.
CPLR 3216: Motion based on general delay.
While Thomas v. Melbert Foods, Inc., 4 has established that
a defendant may move for a dismissal for failure to prosecute
without first serving the plaintiff with a forty-five day demand
for filing a note of issue, some questions remain as to the weight
of the factors which are to be considered in deciding a motion
based upon general delay. In Kasiuba v. New York Times Co., 5
the court has emphasized the defendant's contribution to and
acquiescence in the delay.
In Sortino v. Fisher,86 the most exhaustive survey of the
various factors to be considered on a 3216 motion, the court
noted that while there are exceptions, the duty to prosecute lies
primarily with the plaintiff. While the court in Kasiuba agreed,
it stressed that even though no duty is owed to the plaintiff,
the defendant at least owes a duty to the court to press for
dismissal of the action. In Kasiuba the defendant had waited
two months before serving its answer and another fifteen months
8198 App. Div. 101, 90 N.Y. Supp. 772 (1st Dep't 1904), aff'd memn.,
181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905).
82 Code of Civil Procedure § 793, as amended by ch. 173, Laws of N.Y.
1904.
83 Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 105, 90 N.Y. Supp. 772, 775
(1st Dep't 1904). See also Plachte v. Bancroft, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 437,
433, 161 N.Y.S2d 892, 894 (1st Dep't 1957), wherein the court stated that
"a statute which would impose a mandate upon the court in the otherwise
discretionary handling of time of trial is unconstitutional."
8419 N.Y.2d 216, 225 N.E.2d 534, 278 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967).
85 51 Misc. 2d 700, 273 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1966).
86 20 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963); A Biannual
Survey of New York Practice, 38 ST. JOHN's L. Rsv. 406, 448 (1964).
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before serving a notice of examination before trial. Moreover,
it had waited until eight months after the plaintiff had filed a
note of issue to move for dismissal. In addition, the defendant
had not shown that it had been prejudiced. The plaintiff, on the
other hand, had shown a high degree of merit in its cause of
action. Thus, even though four years and four months had
elapsed between the completion of pretrial disclosure and the filing
of the note of issue, the defendant's motion was denied.
All discretion involves the weighing of concrete factors and,
in the case of a CPLR 3216 motion, it seems reasonable to place
some weight upon the defendant's delay. There is apparent un-
fairness in a rule that would permit a defendant to delay, while
granting the same defendant a windfall because of the plaintiff's
similar delay.
CPLR 3216: Dismissal uider Delaware statute is on the nzerits.
In November, 1958, an action was brought by the plaintiff
in the Superior Court of Delaware. In March, 1963, after almost
five years of delay, the complaint was dismissed because of the
failure to prosecute pursuant to Civil Rule 41(b) of the Rules
of the Superior Court of Delaware. Rule 41(b) provides that
an involuntary dismissal, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication
on the merits unless the order otherwise specifies. The plaintiff
then brought the same action against the same defendant in
New York. The defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR
3211(a) (5), on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action was
barred by res judicata, was granted by the court in Signorile v.
Suzllivan.87 The Delaware order, being a final determination on
the merits of the action by a court of competent jurisdiction,
was entitled to full faith and credit.
The Delaware rule, patterned after Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, is contrary to CPLR 3216 which
states: "Unless the order specifies otherwise, the dismissal is not
on the merits." Perhaps New York courts should consider using
the power to dismiss on the merits. The specter of such use
would seem to be the greatest incentive for the rapid prosecution
of claims. However, due to the harshness of the penalty, its im-
position should be limited to those cases in which summary judg-
ment against the plaintiff would be appropriate.
87 52 Misc. 2d 17, 274 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1966).
